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“Why so Few Women in Value Journals?  How could we 
Find Out?”1 
	
Abstract	
This	paper	takes	as	its	starting	place	Meena	Krishnamurthy’s	discussion	in	this	issue	
of	women’s	underrepresentation	in	“elite”	value	journals.	Her	paper	discusses	a	
specific	remedy,	quotas.		My	paper	focuses	instead	on	the	causal	issue	of	
explanations	for	women’s	underrepresentation	in	these	journals.		I	argue	that	we	
currently	lack	the	data	which	would	allow	us	to	choose	between	various	hypotheses	
(or	combinations	of	hypotheses)	and	I	sketch	the	sorts	of	investigations	that	would	
be	needed	to	further	our	understanding	of	the	causes	for	this	underrepresentation.	
	
	 	
																																																								
1	I	am	very	grateful	to	Meena	Krishnamurthy	for	organizing	the	collection	of	papers;	
to	Rebecca	Kukla’s	wise	editing;	and	to	Liam	Kofi	Bright	and	Natalia	Washington	for	
extremely	useful	discussion	of	these	issues.	
	
	
Meena	Krishnamurthy’s	paper	in	this	issue	presents	compelling	evidence	that	
women	are	publishing	in	“elite”2	value	journals—specifically	Ethics	and	the	Journal	
of	Moral	Philosophy—	at	a	rate	disproportionate	with	their	presence	in	this	area	of	
philosophy.3		She	posits	that	alienation,	implicit	bias,	and	stereotype	threat	may	be	
causes	of	this	underrepresentation,	and	suggests	quotas	as	a	partial	solution	to	the	
problem.		Krishnamurthy	argues	that	quotas	would	reduce	alienation,	stereotype	
threat,	and	implicit	bias—and	help	to	compensate	for	past	effects	of	these.		I	think	
we	can	be	fairly	confident	that	the	factors	Krishnamurthy	cites	are	present	in	our	
profession	(as	I	have	argued	in	my	“Implicit	Bias,	Stereotype	Threat	and	Women	in	
Philosophy”),	and	she	makes	a	compelling	case	for	quotas	as	a	potential	means	of	
reducing	these	barriers.	My	purpose	here	is	to	focus	in	more	closely	on	the	causal	
issue	of	why	women	are	underrepresented	in	these	journals.		There	are	actually	a	
large	number	of	potential	causes,	and	I	argue	that	we	currently	lack	the	empirical	
data	to	fully	understand	the	situation.		My	goal	here	is	not	to	provide	support	for	
any	particular	explanation,	but	instead	to	sketch	out	the	various	hypotheses,	and	to	
consider	what	further	data	we	would	need	to	make	progress	in	explaining	women’s	
underrepresentation	in	elite	value	journals.	
	
																																																								
2	I	should	note	that	I	am	not	entirely	comfortable	with	this	terminology,	use	of	which	
might	seem	to	endorse	a	hierarchy	of	journals	about	which	I	am	dubious.	However,	I	
am	following	the	usage	of	others	in	this	issue,	and	I	think	it	is	clear	that	none	of	us	
actually	endorses	this	hierarchy.		Rather	we	acknowledge	it	as	a	reality	of	the	
philosophical	world	in	which	we	currently	live.	
3	Krishnamurthy	is	herself	drawing	on	data	from	Brooks,	“The	View	From	the	
Journal	of	Moral	Philosophy”;	Norlock,	“Gender	Ratios	of	PapersPublished	in	Ethics	
and	the	Journal	of	Moral	Philosophy”;	and	Henry	Richardson,	"The	Triply	
Anonymous	Review	Process	at	
Ethics,"	APA	Newsletter	on	Feminism	and	Philosophy	10,	no.	1	(2010).	“The	Triply	
Anonymous	Review	Process	at	Ethics”.	
First,	a	brief	review	of	the	data,	based	on	Krishnamurthy’s	discussion	(this	issue).		
Krishnamurthy	estimates	that	women	are	28-30%	of	those	working	in	ethics4.		But	
they	are	only	15-17%	of	those	publishing	in	Ethics	and	the	Journal	of	Moral	
Philosophy.	Both	of	the	journals	under	discussion	show	lower	rates	of	publication	by	
women	than	submission	by	women,	with	20-21%	of	papers	submitted	being	by	
women,	and	15-15%	of	those	published	being	by	women.		We	should	note,	however,	
that	even	the	submission	rates	are	lower	than	those	we	would	predict	given	
women’s	representation	in	this	area	of	philosophy.	
	
It	is	worth	noting	that	the	phenomenon	under	discussion	does	not	seem	to	be	
unique	to	either	value	journals	or	philosophy.		The	generalist	Journal	of	the	
American	Philosophical	Association	also	reports	publication	rates	by	women	that	are	
substantially	lower	than	their	representation	in	the	field.5	Eric	Schwitzgebel’s	
examination	of	5	philosophy	journals	finds	that	that	women	represent	15%	of	
authors	at	ethics	journals	and	11%	at	non-ethics	journals—ratios	nearly	unchanged	
since	the	1970s.6		Such	low	publication	rates	by	women	in	academia	are	known	are	
studied	as	The	Productivity	Paradox,	which	has	received	substantial	attention,	
particularly	with	respect	to	women	in	science.7	
1.	Implicit,	Explicit	Bias	in	refereeing/editing?	
An	obvious	explanation	to	consider	is	that	of	implicit	or	explicit	bias	against	women	
authors.	Explicit	bias	needs	little	explanation:	women	have	long	been	associated	
with	domesticity	and	care,	rather	than	intellect	or	creative	thought,	and	it	is	only	
																																																								
4	This	is	based	on	work	by	Schwitzgebel,	“Citation	of	Women	and	Ethnic	Minorities	
in	the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy”;	and	Jennings,	“The	Gourmet	Ranking	
and	Gender:	How	Can	it	Improve?”.	
5	John	Heil,	"Editorial,"	Journal	of	the	American	Philosophical	Association	1,	no.	2.	
6	Schwitzgebel,	“Only	13%	of	Authors	in	Five	Leading	Journals	are	Women”.	
7	See	for	example	P	Bentley,	"Gender	Differences	and	Factors	Affecting	
Publication	Productivity	among	Australian	University	Academics,"	Journal	of	
Sociology	48,	no.	1	(2012);	ibid.;	M.	F.	Fox,	"Gender,	Family	Characteristics,	and	
Publication	Productivity	among	Scientists,"	Social	Studies	of	Science	35,	no.	1.	
M	Fox,	“Gender	,Family	Characteristics,	and	Publication	Productivity	Among	
Scientists”.	
within	the	last	century	that	they	have	been	granted	widespread	access	to	higher	
education.		Conscious,	explicitly	stated	bias	against	women	and	their	work	in	
philosophy	seems	fortunately	to	be	rare	today	(though	not	non-existent).	
	
Implicit	bias	is	a	phenomenon	that	has	become	increasingly	well-known	by	
philosophers	in	recent	years,	in	which	a	(largely)	unconscious,	(often)	automatic	
bias	affects		(for	example)	judgments	about	members	of	social	groups.8		In	the	case	
at	hand,	the	thought	might	be	that	implicit	biases	about	women	or	women	in	
philosophy	lead	people	to	assess	women’s	work	as	less	good	than	it	is.		There	is	
substantial	evidence	of	a	tendency	to	associate	men	with	intellectual	achievement,	
and	seems	to	affect	the	assessment	of	work.9		For	example,	Knobloch-Westerwick	
showed	that	the	very	same	abstract	in	was	considered	to	be	of	lower	quality	if	it	was	
thought	to	be	by	a	woman10,	and	Moss-Racusin	showed	that	the	same	CV	was	
considered	less	impressive	with	a	woman’s	name	than	a	man’s.11		Very	few	studies	
have	yet	been	done	in	philosophy,	but	we	can	expect	that	general	biases	regarding	
women’s	intellects	would	affect	the	assessment	of	their	work.		There	may	also	be	
specific	biases	regarding	women	in	philosophy	that	could	affect	assessments.		
DiBella,	Miles	and	Saul	showed	male	philosophers	to	implicitly	associate	philosophy	
with	maleness.12		It	would	not	be	surprising,	then,	if—either	due	to	general	cultural	
																																																								
8	For	much	more	on	implicit	bias,	see	;	Michael	Brownstein	and	Jennifer	Saul,	
Implicit	Bias	and	Philosophy	Volume	Ii:	Moral	Responsibility,	Structural	Injustice,	and	
Ethics	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press).	For	an	attempt	to	work	through	ways	that	
implicit	bias	may	manifest	itself	in	philosophy,	see	my	“Implicit	Bias,	Stereotype	
Threat	and	Women	in	Philosophy”.	
9	Valian,	Why	So	Slow?.	
10	Knobloch-Westerwick	and	Glynn,	“The	Matilda	Effect—Role	Congruity	Effects	on	
Scholarly	Communication”.	
11	Moss-Racusin	et.	al.,	“Science	Faculty’s	Subtle	Gender	Biases	Favor	Male	
Students”.	
12	See	“Philosophers	Explicitly	Associate	Philosophy	With	Maleness”.		They	also	
showed	that	female	philosophers	associated	philosophy	with	femaleness.		However,	
given	the	numbers	of	men	in	the	profession,	it	is	far	more	likely	that	a	woman	will	
be	assessed	by	a	man	who	unfairly	downgrades	her	work	than	that	a	man	will	be	
assessed	by	a	woman	who	unfairly	downgrades	his.		It	should	be	noted	however,	
biases	about	women,	or	specific	ones	about	women	in	philosophy—women’s	work	
in	philosophy	was	at	least	sometimes	given	less	than	its	due	because	of	implicit	
biases.	
	
Women	are,	we	have	seen,	being	published	by	these	journals	at	a	rate	lower	than	
that	at	which	they	submit.		Since	it	seems	antecedently	plausible	that	women	and	
men	would	be	producing	equally	good	work,	implicit	or	explicit	bias	seems	initially	
plausible	as	an	explanation	for	this	gap.	
	
However,	the	journals	studied	are	actually	ones	that	rigorously	practice	triple	
anonymous	review.		In	triple	anonymous	review,	authors	are	not	told	referees’	
names;	referees	are	not	told	authors’	names;	and	editors	are	not	told	authors’	
names.		Double	anonymous	review,	in	which	editors	are	aware	of	author’s	identities,	
is	the	norm	in	philosophy	(unlike	many	other	disciplines),	but	triple	anonymous	is	
rare.		It	is,	however,	quite	important,	since	desk	rejections	(rejection	by	the	editor	
without	referee	input)	are	very	common	in	philosophy—up	to	65%.13		So,	it	might	
initially	seem,	both	explicit	and	implicit	bias	are	ruled	out	as	explanations.	
	
1.1	How	bias	could	still	be	present.	
This,	however,	is	too	fast.		There	are	at	least	four	relevant	ways	that	bias,	implicit	or	
explicit,	could	still	be	playing	a	role	in	decisions	about	whether	to	publish	papers.	
1.1.1	Insufficient	anonymisation	
Removal	of	the	author’s	name	may	not	suffice	for	anonymity.		If	the	editor	has	
already	encountered	the	paper	in	question—at	a	conference	for	example—they	may	
know	who	the	author	is.		It	is	not	at	all	clear	to	me	whether	this	is	likely	to	be	the	
case	in	philosophy	or	not.		Many	scientists	tell	me	that	their	fields	are	small	enough	
																																																																																																																																																																					
that	it	has	not	yet	been	demonstrated	that	philosophers’	implicit	associations	
regarding	philosophy	affect	their	assessment	of	work	in	philosophy.			
13	Lee	and	Schunn,	“Philosophy	Journal	Practices	and	Opportunities	for	Bias”.	
that	this	blocks	effective	anoymising	for	their	areas	of	research.		There	may	well	be	
areas	of	philosophy	like	this.			
	
1.1.2	Gender	knowledge	
Removal	of	the	author’s	name	may	not	suffice	to	remove	knowledge	of	gender.		Even	
if	the	author	is	not	recognized,	their	gender	might	be—either	implicitly	or	explicitly.	
Sometimes	this	recognition	will	be	easy—for	example	when	an	author	draws	on	her	
personal	experiences	as	a	woman	in	a	feminism	paper.		However,	it	has	also	been	
suggested	that	people	may	be	able	to	guess	gender	quite	effectively,	at	least	in	
certain	sorts	of	discourse.		Zelcer	and	Litman	found	that	readers	can	guess	gender	at	
better	than	chance,	when	they	rely	on	implicit	strategies	(e.g.	hunches)	rather	than	
on	explicit	gender	stereotypes.14		They	also	found	a	sub-group	of	“high	performers”	
who	displayed	80%	accuracy	relying	on	these	implicit	strategies.		No	studies	have	
yet	been	done	to	see	how	accurate	such	guesses	are	for	philosophical	work.	
	
1.1.3	Subject/Style	bias	
Removal	of	name	does	nothing	for	bias	against	styles/subject	matters.		Some	have	
suggested	that	women	have	a	different	philosophical	style	than	men,	or	that	they	are	
drawn	to	different	sorts	of	topics.		We’ll	start	with	topics.		Sally	Haslanger’s	survey15	
showed	that	the	top	5	areas	of	specialisation	for	women	were	Feminist	Philosophy,	
Applied	Ethics,	Normative	Ethics,	Social	Philosophy/Social	Theory,	and	Political	
Philosophy.		The	top	5	for	men	were	Metaphysics,	Epistemology,	Philosophy	of	
Mind,	Normative	Ethics,	and	Metaethics.		This	is	at	least	some	indication	that	women	
are	drawn	to	the	value	side	of	philosophy.		But	the	journals	we	are	considering	here	
are	specifically	value	journals,	which	surely	won’t	be	biased	against	value	topics.		
However,	there	could	still	be	subject	matter	biases	which	could	have	a	
disproportionate	effect	on	women,	even	within	value	journals—for	example,	a	bias	
against	feminist	philosophy	(or	a	bias	in	favour	of	metaethics)	could	lead	to	a	
																																																								
14	Zelcer	and	Litman,	“Gender	Attribution	and	Implicit	Bias”.	
15	Haslanger,	“Preliminary	Report	of	the	Survey	on	Publishing	in	Philosophy”.	
disproportionately	low	number	of	papers	by	women.				Anecdotal	reports	of	biases	
against	feminist	philosophy	are	widespread,	including	reports	from	those	who	do	
not	themselves	work	in	the	area.16	For	example:	
	
After	expressing	fascination	with	a	course	a	new	(female)	member	of	staff	
was	offering,	on	feminist	philosophy	of	science,	my	advisor	tells	me	not	to	
waste	time	on	‘rubbish	philosophy’	and	do	‘serious	subjects’.	He	also	
condescendingly	described	the	really	established	female	professor	offering	
this	subject	as	not	‘too	poor	given	the	pointless	field	in	which	she	works’.	
https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2014/12/23/things-
that-made-me-doubt-my-future-in-academia	
	
I	am	a	bearded	white	male	with	a	PhD	in	philosophy	who	stopped	working	in	
philosophy	departments	per	se	some	years	ago.	I	left	in	part	because	of	what	
I	saw	as	the	discipline’s	shoddy	treatment	of	feminist	philosophy	in	general	
and	my	female	colleagues	in	particular.	Since	then	I	have	become	a	research	
scientist	respected	in	another	field.	
	
Ironically,	the	fact	that	I	did	graduate	work	in	feminist	epistemology	as	well	
as	in	analytic	epistemology	has	proved	an	asset	in	doing	science.	I	oftentimes	
acknowledge	my	philosophical	background	in	my	professional	talks,	
crediting	it	for	my	theoretical	range	and	ability	to	write	clearly.	
https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2013/09/13/advising-
a-student/	
	
I	do	not	work	in	feminist	philosophy	myself,	and	apparently	that	has	
encouraged	several	male	professors	to	share	with	me	their	view	that	feminist	
philosophy	is	junk	and	not	really	philosophy.	
https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2012/05/07/hang-in-
there-in-spite-of-it-all/	
	
	
It	could	also	be	the	case	that	women	are	drawn	to	different	styles	of	philosophy.		
Certainly	there	have	been	feminist	philosophers	who	argue	that	women	have	a	
different	writing	style,	or	are	drawn	to	more	personal	reflections	than	men.		Work	in	
feminist	philosophy	also	tends	to	span	across	the	analytic/continental	boundary	
																																																								
16	Throughout	this	paper,	I	will	be	taking	examples	from	the	blog	“What	is	it	Like	to	
be	a	Woman	in	Philosophy”.		This	blog	collects	brief	anonymised	anecdotes	about	
life	as	a	woman	in	philosophy.		It	has	become	a	very	useful	resource	for	qualitative	
research.	
more	than	work	in	most	areas.		If	women	do	more	work	in	feminist	philosophy,	this	
may	mean	that	there	work	has	more	continental	elements	to	it.		And	if	there’s	a	bias	
against	such	work	at	these	largely	analytic	journals—which	is	not	inconceivable—
that	could	have	a	disproportionate	effect	on	women.17	
	
1.1.4	Unscrupulous	refereeing	
Unscrupulous	refereeing	could	negate	the	attempt	at	anonymity.		If	referees	google	
the	titles	of	papers,	or	key	phrases,	they	can	easily	learn	the	identities	of	authors.		
Once	this	is	done,	there	is	plenty	of	room	for	both	implicit	and	explicit	biases	to	have	
an	effect	on	judgments.		And	at	least	one	experienced	journal	editor,	Berit	Brogaard,	
has	reported	having	been	told	many	times	about	such	googling.18	
	
“But,”	you	may	ask,	“is	it	really	true	that	referees	google	papers	before	
making	decisions?”	
	
Yep.	It's	true.	I	know.	I	know	because	people	tell	me.	They	are	not	shy	
about	it	either.	They	say	that	that's	what	they	do.	They	don’t	think	it	will	
cause	them	to	make	biased	decisions.	They	just	want	to	know	whose	
paper	they	are	wasting	their	time	on.	
	
You	have	a	quick	comeback:	“There	is	a	way	to	avoid	the	Google	
phenomenon.	Don't	upload	your	paper	to	your	website	until	it's	
forthcoming	in	a	journal.	That	takes	care	of	the	problem,	right?”	
	
Not	really.	If	you	are	prudent,	you	don’t	submit	your	papers	until	your	
ideas	have	been	vetted	at	conferences.	So	when	people	google	your	
paper’s	title,	they	will	find	it,	because	it	was	listed	at	those	conferences.	
	
“But,”	you	think,	“I	am	cleverer	than	the	googling	referee.	I	will	just	change	
the	title	of	my	paper	before	submitting.	So	when	the	referees	google	it,	the	
paper	won't	come	up.”	
																																																								
17	Of	course,	it	is	also	possible	that	work	on	these	topics	or	in	these	areas	is	less	good.	
If	that	were	the	case,	it	would	be	at	best	misleading	to	describe	lower	publication	
rates	for	such	work	as	due	to	a	bias.			
18	Berit	Brogard,	“The	Journal	Reviewing	Process	Isn't	Anonymous.	Did	You	Really	
Think	it	Was?	Think	Again!”	
	
	
Not	so	fast.	Referees	have	told	me	time	and	time	again	that	if	they	don’t	
find	the	title	on	Google,	they	may	google	phrases	(slightly	unusual	ones)	or	
first	lines	or	arbitrary	lines.	So	even	if	you	change	the	paper’s	title,	the	
referees	may	still	figure	out	who	you	are.	
	
1.2	How	can	we	test	for	these	things?	
There	are	studies	that	could	be	done	that	would	give	us	more	information	about	the	
likelihood	of	bias	creeping	in	through	some	of	the	mechanisms	outlined	above.		It	
would	be	well	worth	studying	how	good	professional	philosophers	are	at	guessing	
the	authors	of	anonymous	papers.				One	could	also	study	how	good	they	are	at	
guessing	the	gender.		It	would	be	quite	important	for	the	subjects	in	this	study	to	not	
be	students,	but	rather	people	at	a	level	where	(a)	they	might	be	asked	to	referee;	
and	(b)	they	have	been	exposed	to	philosophy	long	enough	that	an	inability	would	
not	be	explainable	as	due	to	their	short	time	in	the	profession.	
	
Now	let’s	turn	to	the	issue	of	bias	against	styles	or	subject	matters	that	women	tend	
to	work	in/on.		First,	we	would	need	to	study	whether	there	are	such	tendencies	
among	women.		We	already	have	some	data	showing	a	tendency	of	women	to	work	
in	certain	broad	areas,	such	as	Feminism.		It	might	be	possible	to	do	a	further	survey	
looking	at	sub-areas	of	specialization.		It	would,	it	seems	to	me,	be	far	more	difficult	
to	study	styles	of	philosophy	by	gender,	since	we	would	need	a	reliable	way	of	
demarcating	styles	of	philosophy,	and	then	would	need	to	find	some	way	to	measure	
the	relationship	of	this	to	gender.		I	am	far	from	clear	on	how	this	could	be	done.		It	
is	also	far	form	clear	how	we	might	discern	whether	biases	against	areas	and	styles	
of	philosophy	that	are	correlated	with	gender	exist—although	we	could	survey	
philosophers	on	how	they	feel	that	their	style/subject	matter	of	philosophy	is	
received	by	referees.		This	would	at	least	give	us	some	indicative	data	to	work	with.	
	
A	study	of	unscrupulous	googling	might	be	possible,	via	an	anonymous	survey	of	
philosophers,	regarding	how	often	referees	google	papers	prior	to	reviewing	them.		
Software	like	SurveyMonkey	would	give	sufficient	assurance	of	anonymity	that	it	
might	be	possible	to	get	honest	answers.		Very	likely,	results	would	underrepresent	
the	incidence	of	googling,	so	even	a	relatively	low	percentage	would	indicate	a	
serious	problem.		It	might	even	be	possible	to	survey	those	who	have	refereed	for	
the	two	journals	studied,	but	this	could	be	subject	to	concerns	from	ethics	
committees.	
2.	Low	submission	rates	from	women	
The	data	discussed	at	the	start	of	this	paper	showed	that	women	submit	papers	to	
Ethics	and	the	Journal	of	Moral	Philosophy	at	rates	substantially	lower	than	their	
presence	in	these	areas	of	the	subject,	with	women	at	28-30%	in	these	areas	of	the	
subject,	but	constituting	20-21%	of	submissions.		We	do	not	have	data	on	women’s	
acceptance	rates	at	these	journals,	so	we	do	not	know	how	it	compares	to	men’s.		
But	however	the	acceptance	rate	compares,	we	know	that	submission	is	playing	at	
leas	some	role	in	the	underrepresentation	that	we	see.		And	indeed	we	also	know	
that	low	submission	rates	are	worth	studying	more	broadly:		The	Journal	of	the	APA	
reports	(Heil	2015)	that	men	submit	6	papers	for	every	1	that	women	submit,	and	
then	men’s	and	women’s	papers	are	accepted	at	an	equal	rate.		It	is	clearly	worth	
considering,	then,	why	women’s	article	submission	rates	might	be	low.	
	
2.1	Women	choose	other	venues	for	their	work?	
Women	may	be	choosing	not	to	submit	to	these	journals,	because	they	have	
other	places	to	which	they	have	decided	to	send	their	work.		But	there	are	a	
number	of	different	explanations	that	might	hold	for	this	(if	it’s	the	case.)	
	
2.1.1	Underrating	of	own	work	
Women	may	well	be	more	likely	than	men	to	feel	that	their	work	isn’t	good	enough	
for	elite	journals.		We	don’t	have	direct	data	on	this,	but	we	do	know	that	there	is	a	
substantial	body	of	work	indicating	a	tendency	for	women	(more	than	men)	to	
under-rate	their	performance.19	If	this	tendency	carries	over	to	philosophy,	then	it	
may	make	women	reluctant	to	submit	to	“elite”	value	journals	with	low	acceptance	
rates.		As	a	result,	they	may	be	sending	their	papers	to	less	elite	journals.		If	it’s	also	
the	case	that	women	are	more	likely	than	men	to	engage	in	less	mainstream	
methodologies	and	topics,	then	they	may	also	think	for	this	reason	that	elite	
journals	will	be	less	likely	to	accept	their	papers.	
	
Women	in	philosophy	may	also	be	deterred	from	submitting	to	elite	journals	by	
stereotype	threat.		Stereotype	threat	arises	when	someone	from	a	group	that	is	
negatively	stereotyped	at	a	particular	task	is	doing	a	very	difficult	version	of	that	
task	in	high	stakes	situation,	and	cares	a	lot	about	doing	well.		It	can	cause	
underperformance,	and	it	can	also	cause	avoidance	of	the	task/situation.20		
Attempting	to	publish	in	a	top-tier	journal	is	high	stakes	and	very	difficult,	and	those	
trying	to	make	an	academic	career	care	very	much	about	it.		Women	in	philosophy	
are	likely	to	suffer	from	stereotype	threat,	due	to	the	explicit	stereotype	of	
philosophy	as	male,	and	due	to	the	foundational	role	of	logic,	which	is	likely	to	be	
affected	by	the	well	known	stereotype	of	mathematics	as	male.21	If	all	this	is	right,	
stereotype	threat	may	cause	women	to	avoid	the	most	stereotype	threat-inducing	
environments	for	when	they	send	off	their	papers,	choosing	other	venues	instead.	
2.1.2	Invited	papers	
Another	possibility	arises	from	the	fact	that,	in	recent	years,	editors	of	collections	
have	become	increasingly	concerned	about	the	demographics	of	their	authors.		(This	
																																																								
19		See	for	example	Ehrlinger	and	Dunning,	“How	Chronic	Self-Views	Influence	(and	
Potentially	Mislead)	Estimates	of	Performance”;	Reuben,	Sapienza	and	Zingales,	
“How	Stereotypes	Impair	Women’s	Careers	in	Science”.	
20	See	Goguen,	“Stereotype	Threat.	Epistemic	Injustice	and	Rationality”;	McKinnon,	
“Stereotype	Threat	and	Attributional	Ambiguity”;	Spencer,	Steele	and	Quinn,	
“Stereotype	Threat	and	Women’s	Math	Performance”;	Steele,	Whistling	Vivaldi.	
21	Spencer,	Steele	and	Quinn,	“Stereotype	Threat	and	Women’s	Math	Performance”;	
Steele,	Whistling	Vivaldi;	Saul,	“Implicit	Bias,	Stereotype	Threat	and	Women	in	
Philosophy”;	Haslanger,	“Changing	the	Ideology	and	Culture	of	Philosophy”;	DiBella,	
Miles	and	Saul,	“Philosophers	Explicitly	Associate	Philosophy	With	Maleness”.	
may	be	due	partly	to	the	success	of	the	Gendered	Conference	Campaign22.)		Their	
efforts	to	find	women	contributors	might	be	leading	to	a	situation	in	which	women	
are	more	likely	than	men	to	have	an	invited	venue	for	their	work.		(This	is	one	
explanation	that	Heil	considers	for	the	low	rate	of	female	submission	to	the	Journal	
of	the	APA.)		Given	the	length	and	uncertainty	of	the	journal	review	process,	it	can	be	
a	completely	rational	decision	to	take	up	an	invitation	rather	than	sending	a	paper	
to	a	journal.	
2.2	Women	write	fewer	papers?	
It	is	also	entirely	possible	that	women	submit	fewer	papers	to	journals	because	they	
write	fewer	papers.		But	of	course	this	would	also	need	explaining.		There	are	at	
least	two	broad	categories	of	explanations	for	this.	
	
2.2.1	Women	have	more	competing	responsibilities.	
It	may	be	the	case	that	women	spend	more	time	than	men	on	activities	other	than	
research,	leading	to	less	time	for	research.		Evidence	on	this	is	a	bit	mixed.		We’ll	
start	with	the	thought	that	women	spend	more	time	on	administrative	tasks:	
Bentley’s	“Gender	Differences	and	Factors	Affecting	Publication	Productivity	Among	
Australian	Academics”	reports	men	and	women	spending	approximately	the	same	
number	of	hours	on	administrative	tasks,	and	that	these	tasks	interfere	with	the	
research	to	the	same	extent	for	women	and	men.		However,	Misra’s	“The	Ivory	
Ceiling	of	Service	Work”	reports	that	women	at	mid-career	(Associate	Professor	
level)	spend	substantially	more	time	than	men	on	service/administrative	work,	
leaving	men	at	this	level	with	7.5	hours	more	for	research	each	week	than	women	at	
this	level.	
	
It	is	also	still	the	case	that	women	do	more	housework	and	childcare	than	men.		
Mothers	spend	twice	as	much	time	on	childcare	as	fathers	do.	Women	also	do	more	
housework	than	men.		Half	of	women	do	some	housework	on	a	typical	day,	but	only	
																																																								
22	https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/gendered-conference-campaign/	
20%	of	men	do.	23		If	women	have	more	of	their	time	taken	up	by	these	competing	
responsibilities,	it	seems	reasonable	to	suppose	that	they	will	have	less	time	for	
writing	papers.		Surprisingly,	however,	family	responsibilities	do	not	seem	to	
correlate	in	the	expected	way	with	productivity:	Fox,	reporting	the	results	of	several	
studies,	notes	that	“the	presence	of	children	has	either	no	effect…a	slightly	negative,	
insignificant	effect…,	or	a	positive	effect”	.24		Fox	hypothesizes	that	women	with	
children	in	science	are	highly	selective	about	their	time	allocation,	cutting	back	on	
other	activities	rather	than	research	and	childcare.	
	
This	appealing	hypothesis,	then,	might	seem	to	be	one	that	we	should	set	aside.		
However,	not	all	of	women’s	competing	responsibilities	readily	show	up	on	studies	
of	time	allocation	that	ask	about	research,	teaching,	and	administrative	duties.		
Women	also	tend	to	spend	a	great	deal	of	time	on	the	“invisible	labour”	of	
mentoring,	counseling	and	advising	students	in	an	informal	manner.	Here	is	a	
passage	from	Green’s	recent	“Thanks	for	Listening”:	
	
I	estimate	that	someone	cries	in	my	office	at	least	once	every	three	weeks.	
I’m	not	a	therapist,	a	counselor,	a	social	worker,	a	minister,	or	a	psychologist.	
I’m	not	even	a	department	chair.	I’m	a	female	professor	at	a	research	
university,	where	faculty	members	and	students	—	especially	graduate	
students	—	regularly	show	up	at	my	office,	often	after	sending	me	a	vague	
email	asking	if	I	have	time	to	talk.	And	then	they	tell	me	things.	Things	that	
lead	to	tears….	
	
When	I	mention	the	frequency	of	these	types	of	conversations	in	my	office	or	
point	to	the	tissue	box	I	keep	on	my	desk,	a	few	women	colleagues	nod	their	
heads	knowingly,	but	many	professors	act	baffled:	Why	would	someone	cry	
in	your	office?	Men	in	particular	say	that.	
	
	
This	issue	has	been	studied	by	social	scientists	as	a	part	of	what	is	called	“identity	
taxation”,	a	term	Amado	Padilla	initially	coined	to	describe	the	additional	burdens	
																																																								
23	Covert,	“Why	it	Matters	that	Women	Do	Most	of	the	Housework”.	
24	Fox,	“Gender,	Family	Characteristics,	and	Publication	Productivity	Among	
Scientists”:	132.	
imposed	on	faculty	who	are	members	of	minority	racial	and	ethnic	groups.25				
Hirschfield	and	Joseph	have	extended	the	concept	to	cover	other	under-represented	
identities.26		They	focused	particularly	on	the	additional	burdens	of	advising	
students	in	crisis,	and	on	the	complexities	introduced	by	both	intersections	of	
identities	(e.g.	being	a	black	woman),	and	the	assumption	that	possessing	one	
minority	identity	(e.g.	being	black)	would	automatically	make	one	an	appropriate	
advisor	with	respect	to	other	minority	identities	(e.g.	being	lesbian).		Hirschfield	and	
Joseph	suggest	that	these	burdens	are	both	heavy	and	under-appreciated.		They	do	
not	count	as	part	of	one’s	academic	job	in	any	formal	way,	but	they	are	often	felt	to	
be	inescapable,	and	they	are	highly	demanding	in	terms	of	time,	energy,	and	
emotion.		Indeed,	they	suggest	that	this	may	play	a	role	in	lower	rates	of	publication.		
It	certainly	seems	worth	investigating	whether	this	affects	research	productivity	
among	women	in	philosophy.	
	
2.2.2	Hostile	Climate	
	
Settles	et.	al.	studied	women	scientists	and	found	that	“women’s	perceptions	of	a	
positive	or	supportive	department	climate	were	related	to	higher	levels	of	job	
satisfaction	and	productivity”.27		This	suggests	that	a	hostile	climate	for	women	
could	be	related	to	women’s	lower	levels	of	publication.		In	recent	years,	many	
philosophers	have	argued	that	women	face	a	hostile	environment	in	Philosophy.28		
And	many	women	have	provided	stories	detailing	their	experience	with	a	hostile	
environment	on	What	is	it	Like	to	be	a	Woman	in	Philosophy.		Here’s	just	one	
example29:	
I	have	been	thinking	for	a	while	now	about	sending	in	my	own	experiences	of	
																																																								
25	Padilla,	“Ethnic	Minority	Scholars,	Research,	and	Mentoring”.	
26	Hirshfield	and	Joseph,	“We	Need	a	Woman,	We	Need	a	Black	Woman”.	
27	I.	Settles	et	al.,	"The	Climate	for	Women	in	Academic	Science:	The	Good,	the	Bad,	
and	the	Changeable,"	Psychology	of	Women	Quarterly	30	(2006):	54.	
28		See,	for	example,	Haslanger’s	“Changing	the	Ideology	and	Culture	of	Philosophy”	
and	Saul’s	“Philosophy	Has	a	Sexual	Harassment	Problem”.	
29	https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2012/10/23/the-life-of-a-
woman-in-philosophy/.	
harassment	and	discrimination.	There	are	actually	too	many	to	list	in	detail,	
but	here	are	a	few:	
	
1. As	an	undergraduate	I	was	invited	to	be	a	TA.	Very	soon,	the	sixty-
something	professor	I	was	working	with	started	inviting	me	to	his	house	
to	discuss	philosophy	and	when	I	accepted,	he	asked	me	if	I	would	pose	
nude	for	his	art	(I	was	actually	quite	surprised	to	see	a	similar	story	
posted	here	since	I	imagined	that	such	a	thing	would	be	rare.)	He	then	
professed	his	love	for	me-	making	things	very	uncomfortable	since	we	
had	to	finish	out	the	semester	together.	I	was	young	and	naive	(17)	and	
let	the	whole	thing	slide.	
	
2. I	had	just	completed	my	first	year	at	a	top	graduate	program	and	was	
excited	to	receive	an	excellent	evaluation	by	the	graduate	adviser	that	I	
had	been	perceived	to	be	a	very	good	student-	at	the	top	of	my	incoming	
class.	Shortly	after	that,	I	was	approached	by	a	very	influential	(married)	
member	of	the	department	to	be	his	RA.	I	had	never	had	a	class	with	him	
so	I	thought	that	this	was	because	I	was	doing	so	well	in	the	program.	One	
month	into	working	with	this	man,	as	I	was	pointing	out	some	of	the	
flaws	in	one	of	his	arguments,	he	put	his	hand	on	my	knee	and	said	“I	
can’t	concentrate	on	what	you	are	saying	because	you	are	just	so	
beautiful.”	I	was	stunned	and	asked	him	if	we	could	get	back	to	work.	
Later,	I	learned	that	this	sort	of	thing	was	common-	that	he	treated	many	
women	philosophy	grad	students	the	same	way,	but	that	it	was	unwise	to	
report	him	because	he	was	so	famous	the	department	would	never	really	
punish	him	and	I	would	get	pegged	as	a	trouble	maker.	
	
3. I	have	heard	other	male	grad	student	deriding	female	grad	students	in	a	
way	that	makes	it	clear	that	they	were	taking	their	perceived	
shortcomings	as	representative	of	all	female	philosophers.	These	fellow	
grad	students	also	were	much	more	interested	in	my	sex	life	than	in	
hearing	my	ideas.	I	have	had	it	implied	by	these	fellow	grad	students	that	
I	and	other	women	were	at	this	top	philosophy	program,	not	because	of	
their	abilities	but	because	of	some	sort	of	affirmative	action.	(I	do	not	
mean	to	suggest	that	all	the	male	grad	students	in	my	department	were	
this	way,	but	the	few	that	were	made	it	really	uncomfortable	to	be	a	
women	philosopher.)	
	
	
4. I	have	been	ignored,	talked	over,	and	talked	down	to	on	may	occasions.	
When	I	gave	an	objection	to	a	view	in	a	philosophy	seminar,	just	ten	
minutes	later,	the	teacher	credited	and	praised	a	male	student	for	having	
come	up	with	the	objection.	The	male	student	had	not	even	spoken.	After	
conference	talks	and	elsewhere,	I	have	had	speakers	talk	to	the	other	men	
in	a	group,	but	ignore	my	comments	and	questions	or	give	cursory,	
dumbed-down	responses.	
	
5. I	have	been	asked,	after	receiving	favorable	reports	from	professors,	if	I	
am	sure	that	it	this	was	not	just	because	I	am	pretty	that	I	was	getting	
such	good	reviews.	
	
	
6. I	have	been	told	that	women	are	not	cut	out	for	philosophy	and	that	they	
are	not	as	gifted	in	math	and	logic	and	this	is	why	they	should	probably	
stay	away	from	‘hard	philosophy’	like	metaphysics,	epistemology	and	
philosophy	of	mind	(the	areas	I	work	in.)	
	
	
If	Settles	et.	al.	are	right,	then	it	is	no	surprise	for	women	in	philosophy	to	be	less	
productive	than	men.		(Notably,	we	would	also	expect	them	to	be	less	satisfied	in	
their	jobs.)		But	we	might	still	want	to	know	why	women	facing	a	hostile	
environment	are	less	productive	than	men,	and	there	are	several	possible	reasons.	
	
2.2.1	Lower	confidence	levels	
Being	faced	with	an	inhospitable,	hostile	environment	on	a	day-to-day	basis	wears	
one	down.		It	is	hard	to	keep	up	one’s	sense	of	self-worth	and	abilities	if	one	feels	
constantly	in	need	of	proving	that	one	belongs	in	a	profession,	and	if	others	are	
making	comments	to	undermine	one’s	confidence.		One	contributor	to	the	blog	
“What	is	it	Like	to	be	a	Woman	in	Philosophy”	initially	wrote	of	how	difficult	she	
found	it	to	believe	that	she	belonged	in	philosophy,	and	then	followed	up	with	a	post	
explaining	how	she	came	to	so	lack	confidence:	
It	was	because	my	first	day	on	campus	the	professor	who	I	had	intended	to	
work	with	told	me	that	after	seeing	my	application,	he	wouldn’t	be	surprised	
if	I	performed	so	poorly	that	I	failed	out	and	that	I	didn’t	have	the	right	
‘pedigree’	for	students	at	a	program	of	this	caliber.	Waiting	in	the	hall	outside	
my	first	seminar,	I	overheard	a	group	of	male	students	in	my	cohort	
discussing	that	the	women	in	our	cohort	might	have	been	admitted	because	
of	affirmative	action	rather	than	merit.	
(https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2014/04/21/on-
speaking-the-whole-truth/)	
	
Women	in	academia,	quite	generally,	report	lower	levels	of	encouragement	to	
publish	as	PhD	students.30		If	women	are	faced	with	an	outright	hostile	atmosphere,	
and	then	receive	less	encouragement,	it	is	no	surprise	at	all	if	they	have	lower	levels	
of	confidence	in	their	work.				From	here,	it	is	easy	to	see	how	less	work	gets	written:	
those	with	less	confidence	will	be	slower	to	believe	their	work	is	ready	to	publish,	
engage	in	more	re-writing,	and	perhaps	spend	more	time	soliciting	comments	from	
others	before	sending	a	paper	off.31			
	
2.2.2	Anticipation	of	hostility	
This	explanation,	from	Bright’s	“Decision	Theoretic	Model	of	the	Productivity	Gap”,	
is	related	to	but	subtly	different	from	the	lack	of	confidence	explanation.		It	is	that	
women,	due	to	the	hostile	climate	they	experience,	anticipate	that	their	work	will	
not	be	taken	seriously.		Given	such	a	perception,	it	becomes	rational	for	them	to	
spend	more	time	polishing	and	perfecting	work	before	sending	it	off,	thus	leading	to	
lower	productivity.		In	addition	to	the	evidence	of	hostile	environments	surveyed	
above,	there	is	also	anecdotal	evidence	of	women	in	philosophy	anticipating	a	
hostile	reception	in	this	way.		From	What	is	it	Like	to	be	a	Woman	in	Philosophy:	
	
“I’m	sick	of	feeling	like	an	imposter	in	this	discipline,	and	I’m	sick	of	having	to	
work	twice	as	hard	as	all	the	guys	to	get	even	roughly	comparable	marks”	
(https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2014/09/22/things-
im-sick-of/)	
	
	
There	is	also	(again	anecdotal)	evidence	that	this	anticipation	may	be	at	least	
sometimes	accurate.		Here	is	a	story	from	a	male	philosopher:	
Every	time	I	said	something	positive	about	a	female	candidate	(even	casually,	
in	the	hallway	or	in	someone’s	office),	the	immediate	response	by	my	former	
colleagues	was	to	make	a	case	against	that	candidate.	If	I	said	of	some	female	
candidate,	“I	really	liked	x’s	writing	sample,”	the	response	would	be,	“But	
there	was	a	line	in	one	of	her	letters	that	made	me	wonder	if	she	is	the	
strongest	candidate	from	her	department,”	or	“But	she	went	to	college	at	an	
																																																								
30	Bentley,	“Gender	Differences	and	Factors	Affecting	Publication	Productivity	
Among	Australian	University	Academics”	
31	Bright	also	defends	this	explanation,	which	he	develops	in	importantly	different	
ways,	in	his	“Decision	Theoretic	Model	of	the	Productivity	Gap”.	
Ivy	League	school,	so	she	might	not	be	the	best	fit	for	us.”	Meanwhile,	if	I	said	
anything	positive	about	a	male	candidate,	the	response	was	always	just	to	
agree,	and	perhaps	to	add	a	further	positive	comment	about	that	candidate.	
(This	was	such	a	striking	and	uncanny	phenomenon	that	I	went	out	of	my	
way	to	test	it,	thinking	that	I	was	imagining	the	effect.	And	sure	enough,	it	
was	really	happening.)	
<https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2015/11/18/do-
women-and-minorities-have-an-advantage-on-the-job-market/>	
	
This	explanation	differs	from	the	lower	confidence	explanation	because,	on	this	
explanation,	it	need	not	be	that	women	lack	confidence	in	their	abilities:	they	may	
think	that	they	are	great	at	philosophy,	and	that	they	write	great	papers.		They	may	
even	think	that	the	paper	they’ve	just	decided	to	rewrite	some	more	is	already	
fantastic.		However,	because	of	the	hostility	of	the	field	they	may	feel	that	they	need	
to	make	it	even	better.		(Whether	or	not	the	refereeing	process	is	succeeding	in	
preventing	referees	from	knowing	their	gender,	they	may	well	believe	that	their	
gender	will	be	known.)		Since	they	believe	that	they	need	to	make	their	work	even	
better	to	get	it	published,	they	will	take	longer	over	their	work	and	publish	less.	
	
2.2.3	Hostile	environment	distracts	from	research	
One	facing	a	seriously	hostile	environment32	may	have	difficulty	finding	the	time	or	
energy	to	produce	a	high	volume	of	research.		I	have	not	been	able	to	find	studies	
regarding	the	time	taken	up	by	dealing	a	hostile	environment,	but	it	is	not	difficult	to	
see	that	this	could	happen.		Obviously	pressing	formal	charges	of	harassment	or	
discrimination	is	immensely	time-consuming	and	exhausting.		But	even	those	who	
don’t	do	this	face	a	level	of	stress	not	faced	by	those	in	friendlier	environments.		
Stress	is	known	to	be	exhausting,	and	fighting	battles	is	time-consuming.	It	is	clear	
that	women	in	hostile	environments	in	philosophy	have	to	fight	many	battles:	
I	was	employed	as	a	feminist	philosopher	in	a	department	where	I	was	the	
only	woman;	that	is	to	say,	I	was	employed	to	teach	feminist	theory	in	
																																																								
32	I	am	focused	here	on	a	hostile	work	environment,	but	a	hostile	environment	more	
broadly	is	also	bound	to	be	relevant.		Even	if	a	Muslim	woman	philosopher	finds	a	
congenial	work	environment,	regular	harassment	and	airport	profiling	are	very	
likely	to	wear	her	down	and	make	work	more	difficult.		(I	thank	Natalia	Washington	
for	discussion	of	this	point.)		
philosophy.	From	the	beginning	there	were	questions	about	my	competency,	
about	the	nature	of	my	work,	and	with	that,	very	little	support	from	my	male	
colleagues.	I	felt	very	undermined,	and	this	did	not	help	my	profound	lack	of	
confidence.	I	was	given	no	mentoring,	and	the	one	senior	woman	in	a	cognate	
discipline,	was	an	anti-philosopher.	She	had	no	sympathy	or	understanding	
for	what	I	was	doing.	One	of	my	colleagues	came	and	shouted	at	me	in	front	
of	a	grad	student	when	I	sent	him	an	email	in	which	I	mis-spelt	his	name.	As	a	
result,	I	moved	my	office.	No-one	came	to	invite	me	back	to	the	department;	
no-one	tried	to	sort	the	issue	out.	No-one	apologised.	To	this	day	the	former	
colleague	has	never	acknowledged	his	role	in	my	moving	office.	I	eventually	
returned	to	another	office	in	the	department	but	the	whole	event	was	
ignored	and	never	spoken	of.	When	I	unsuccessfully	applied	for	a	promotion	
at	the	very	same	time	my	first	book	with	a	first	rate	publisher	was	published,	
no-one	helped	me	out	or	suggested	I	lodge	an	appeal.	Yet	there	were	clearly	
politics	involved	in	my	lack	of	success.	When	I	was	head	of	the	department,	
my	male	colleagues	basically	ignored	me	or	undermined	any	of	my	efforts	to	
secure	pedagogical	changes	that	would	benefit	the	discipline.	
(https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2013/11/17/what-
drove-me-out-of-my-department/)	
	
The	person	who	sent	in	the	post	above	did	not	mention	what	happened	to	her	
productivity	under	the	circumstances	she	describes,	but	it	would	be	very	surprising	
if	it	was	not	reduced.		Although	she	mentions	publishing	a	book	with	a	first-rate	
publisher,	one	can	only	imagine	how	much	more	she	might	have	been	able	to	do	if	
she	had	not	had	to	contend	with	the	battles	and	opposition	that	she	did	
	
	
2.3	How	could	we	study	this?	
	
It	seems	to	me	entirely	possible	to	study	at	least	some	of	the	explanations	discussed	
in	this	section,	and	indeed	I	am	now	in	the	planning	stages	of	doing	so.		A	simple	
survey	could	be	used	to	study	decisions	by	both	men	and	women	not	to	send	papers	
to	particular	journals	that	are	widely	seen	as	“elite”.		By	inquiring	about	the	number	
of	and	reasons	for	these	decisions,	we	could	learn	whether	there	are	gender	
differences	in	(a)	the	likelihood	of	submitting	to	these	journals;	and	(b)	whether	and	
why	other	other	venues	are	preferred.		A	survey	could	also	be	used	to	ask	men	and	
women	about	number	of	papers	written	over	a	particular	time	period,	thus	
informing	us	about	whether	women	write	fewer	papers.		We	could	also	learn	a	great	
deal	by	surveying	women	and	men	in	philosophy	about	the	climate	that	they	
encounter.		Various	individual	departments	have	done	this	in	order	to	arrive	at	a	
better	understanding	of	their	own	situations,	but	this	has	not	yet	been	attempted	as	
a	way	of	gauging	the	climate	in	philosophy	more	broadly.		It	would	even	be	possible	
to	ask	about	publication	rates	as	a	part	of	the	climate	survey,	thus	allowing	us	to	
learn	whether	reported	hostile	climate	is	correlated	with	reported	lower	
publication	rates.		Finally	it	would	be	quite	easy	to	survey	men	and	women	on	the	
amount	of	time	they	spend	with	students	in	distress,	and	to	look	for	a	correlation	
with	research	productivity.	
3.	Lower	quality	work	from	women	
It	is,	of	course,	conceptually	possible	that	women	are	publishing	fewer	papers	in	
these	journals	simply	because	their	work	is	less	good	than	men’s.		However,	there	is	
no	reason	to	believe	that	this	is	the	case.	Given	the	wide	range	of	other	explanations	
available,	we	should	be	extremely	reluctant	to	even	entertain	a	retrograde	
explanation	like	this.		Our	reluctance	should	increase	exponentially	when	we	
consider	the	ways	in	which	taking	this	unsupported	hypothesis	seriously	would	
impact	on	the	experience	of	women	in	philosophy	who	are	already	very	likely	
experiencing	a	hostile	environment.		Accordingly,	I	will	give	this	one	no	further	
space	here.	
4.	Conclusion	
	
In	short,	we	do	not	yet	know	why	women	publish	at	such	low	rates	in	the	value	
journals	that	are	the	subject	of	this	special	issue.		We	do,	however,	have	a	wealth	of	
hypotheses	to	explore	and	some	clear	and	promising	directions	for	research.	
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